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a back-up system to catch a few scoundrels otherwise immune under criminal
statutes, any such benefit is outweighed by the need in a democratic society for
predictability and fair warning in its criminal justice system. Hopefully, the
Florida Legislature will view the instant decision as a signal to act and will
recognize the wisdom of abolishing all criminal offenses not defined by statute.
ElSm TuRNER ApmoRI"

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RETRACES ITS STEPS

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974)
Petitioner purchased household items on an installment sales contract, giving respondent a vendor's lien and privilege on the goods., When petitionerdebtor defaulted, respondent-creditor filed suit for payment of the overdue
balance and made an ex parte application for a writ of sequestration. 2 On
authority of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure the judge issued the writ
and the goods were seized. 3 Petitioner was not afforded notice or opportunity
1. WV.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La. 627, 635-39, 269 So. 2d 186, 189-90 (1972). At
common law a vendor loses his vendor's lien when he delivers the goods to the vendee. The
Louisiana Civil Code, however, accords a vendor's privilege to one who has sold movable
property that is not paid for at the time of delivery. The privilege is a preference on that
property over any other creditor as long as the property is in the possession of the vendee.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952); Margolin, Vendor's Privilege, 4 TUL. L. REv. 237,
237-40 (1929). The vendor's privilege does not follow the goods when they leave the vendee's
possession. It is a substantive right that is not self-implementing. W.T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell,
263 La. 627, 635-39, 269 So. 2d 186, 189-90 (1972). See H. DAGGETr, LOUISIANA PRIILEGEs AND
CHATFEL MORTGAGES (1942); Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts
and Effect upon Louisiana Law, 47 TuL. L. Rxv. 806 (1972).
2. 263 La. at 642, 269 So. 2d at 191. A writ of sequestration issues only on a claim of
ownership right or possessory right on a mortgage, lien, or privilege if it is within the power
of the debtor to conceal, dispose of, or waste the property or remove the property from the
area before a final hearing. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (1961). "Sequestration is a
process .. . [used] . .. as a conservatory writ whenever the right of property is involved to
preserve pending litigation specific property subject to conflicting claims of ownership or
liens and privileges." McComic v. Scrinopskie, 76 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
3. 263 La. at 631, 269 So. 2d at 187. Under the sequestration procedure the creditor
makes an ex parte application for the writ showing his right to the property and alleging
that the debtor will conceal, dispose of, or waste the property. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. arts.
3501, 3571 (1961). The applicant must submit an affidavit swearing to the facts of his allegation. Id. art. 3501. The writ is then issued, conditioned only on the creditor filing a
bond as security for any damages caused the debtor. Id. arts. 3501, 3506, 3574. The debtor
may file immediately after seizure for a dissolution of the writ that he will obtain unless
the creditor proves the grounds on which the writ was issued. Id. art. 3506. A final judgment
must be obtained before the goods are disposed of unless they are perishables. Id. arts. 3510,
3513. The judgment prayed for in the instant case was $574.14 and the security bond was
set at $1,125. 263 La. at 629, 269 So. 2d at 187.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1974

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 16
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

for a hearing. One month after the seizure, petitioner filed a motion to dissolve the writ on the grounds that the seizure violated due process. Denial of
5
4
the motion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed and HELD, Louisiana's statutory
sequestration procedure does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.6
The right of a creditor to sequester goods that are security for his loan is
deeply imbedded in the ancient civil law. 7 Initially, the Supreme Court considered such prejudgment seizures constitutionally permissible,8 holding that
due process was satisfied if the debtor received a hearing prior to final deprivation of the property. 9 Changing concepts of fairness, however, undermined this rigid doctrine, and the Supreme Court, in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.,1O held that post-seizure hearings would not always satisfy due
process requirements. 1 Finding prejudgment garnishment of wages to be a
"most inhuman doctrine" 12 that could "drive a wage earning family to the
wall,"13 the Court held that a debtor could not be subjected to such hardships
without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.
4. 263 La. at 631, 269 So. 2d at 187. Both Mitchell's motion to dissolve the writ and
application to proceed in fonna pauperis were denied by the judge of the city court. A
subsequent application for review by the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit of Louisiana, was
also denied. Id.
5. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 411 U.S. 981 (1973).
6. 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974) (Powell, J., concurred separately; Stewart, Douglas, Marshall,
and Brennan, JJ., dissented).
7. 94 S. Ct. at 1899. The remedy is provided by Louisiana procedural law, which has
long recognized prejudgment seizure by sequestration. W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell, 263 La.
at 638, 269 So. 2d at 190. See also Baldwin v. Black, 119 U.S. 643, 649 (1886).
8. In Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), the Supreme Court upheld a Delaware
statute that conditioned the appearance of a nonresident debtor to defend his attached
property on the posting of a bond equal in value to the property attached. Coffin Bros. &
Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), approved the placement of a lien, without prior hearing,
on property of stockholders of an insolvent bank. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929),
afJ'g per curiam 141 A. 699 (Me. 1928), approved a prejudgment attachment made on ex
parte application, after which there was a hearing.
9. In McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1929), aff'g per curiam 141 A. 699 (Me. 1928), the
Court held that a prejudgment attachment was not a deprivation of property for due process purposes because there was no deprivation of title, the deprivation was temporary, and
there was a final hearing.
10. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
I1. Sniadach held the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment procedure unconstitutional
because it allowed seizure of the debtor's wages without notice or opportunity for a hearing.
Unlike the instant case, the garnishing creditor has no interest in the property seized. The
Court stated that summary procedures may be sufficient for due process in some situations,
that is, a situation requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest, citing Coffin
Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928), and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921), as
examples of constitutional prejudgment seizures. Id. at 339. This suggests that the Court
would balance the creditor's interest in security with the debtor's interest in possession. See
Comment, Foreign Attachments After Sniadach and Fuentes, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 342 (1972),
on the constitutionality of prehearing seizures when used to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident.
12. 395 U.S. at 340, quoting 114 CONG. Rac. 1832 (1969).
13. 395 U.S. at 341-42.
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By shifting the focus of procedural due process from creditors' interest in
security for repayment, to debtors' property rights, Sniadach broke with traditional doctrine. Unfortunately, it was not dear whether the holding carved out
an exception merely for wages or articulated a new procedural rule. Therefore,
when requested to apply the decision to property other than wages, lower
courts divided into two contrasting interpretations. Courts that restricted the
Sniadach holding to its subject matter found support in the Supreme Court's
recognition of wages as a "specialized type of property."1.4 A second line of
cases, however, applied the rationale that procedural due process prohibited
deprivation of property without notice or opportunity to be heard unless an
"extraordinary situation" 15 warranted delay. 16
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Sniadach two years later in
Fuentes v. Shevin. 7 There, the Court specifically rejected the restrictive subject matter test that limited due process protection to "necessities of life.'"',

Rather, it adopted the broader, procedural interpretation affording due process
to any "significant property interest" of the debtor. 19 By removing uncertainty
about the type of property protected, Fuentes settled one matter left open by
Sniadach. The Court, however, did not define "extraordinary circumstances"
by which a case could escape the Fuentes strictures, and it is through this open20
ing that the principal decision finds release.
14. Id. at 340. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P,Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970)
(upholding preheating seizure of bowling equipment under replevin statute); Reeves v.
Motor Contract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (dicta upholding Georgia garnishment
in attachment against property other than wages); American Olean Tile Co. v. Zimmerman,
317 F. Supp. 150 (D. Hawaii 1970) (upholding garnishment of any property except wages).
These decisions employed a balancing test, weighing the severity to the debtor of the deprivation of that particular type of property against the right of payment to the creditor.
15. 395 U.S. at 339.
16. See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970)
(creditor replevy of items without a hearing found unconstitutional); Klim v. Jones, 315
F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeeper's lien found unconstitutional); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 924
(1971) (general attachment of property by creditor disallowed because made ex parte); Larson
v. Fetherson, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (garnishment of bank account found
unconstitutional). These decisions employed a strict procedural standard regarding the necessity of notice and hearing prior to the deprivation of property but also stressed that the items
seized as necessary as wages, indicating a balancing of interests.
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1971). In Fuentes the Court held the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin
statutes unconstitutional because they did not provide notice or opportunity for a hearing
prior to seizure. The seller retained a security interest in the goods sold under a conditional
sales contract, but the Court found the degree of ownership inconsequential to due process.
Id. Prior to Fuentes the Supreme Court did little to clarify the intent of the Sniadach decision. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971) (hearing required before parole revocation); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (hearing required before the state can revoke
the license of an uninsured motorist); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required before termination of welfare benefits). These decisions were phrased in terms that
indicated a balance between the interests of the parties, but their thrust was toward increased recognition of due process rights.
18. 407 U.S. at 89-90.
19. Id. at 86.
20. Id. at 90-93. The Court cited several cases that held lack of notice and opportunity
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Fuentes established the broad parameters of an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying seizure without notice or opportunity to be heard: (1) the
seizure must be directly necessary to secure an important government or general public interest, (2) a special need for very prompt action must exist, and
(3) judicial control must be exerted over the state power. 21 Unlike the procedures considered in Fuentes, the Louisiana statutory procedures met the last
two requirements. A writ of sequestration may issue only upon a showing of
an immediate need to repossess the property, and the procedure required
judicial control from the commencement of the process to its conclusion.22 It
is not clear whether the facts of the instant case satisfy the first requirement,
but satisfaction can readily be inferred from the Court's emphasis in its due
process analysis on the importance of a fluid economy.
The instant opinion sought to stem the disruption of the commercial structure resulting from increased notice and hearing requirements without totally
2 3
abrogating Fuentes..
Justice White, writing for the majority, distinguished

for a hearing was constitutional if there were a valid interest on the other side that outweighed the possessory interest. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (deprivation of government employment for security reason); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339
U.S. 594 (1950) (misbranded drugs); Fahley v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (bank failure);
Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 587 (1931) (collect internal revenues); Coffin Bros. & Co.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) (mismanagement of bank deposits); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256
U.S. 94 (1921) (attach foreign property); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garson, 254 U.S. 554
(1920) (war effort); North American Stock Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated
food). Sniadach cited several of these cases as examples of "extraordinary situations" where
due process requirements are met by summary procedures. See also Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1970); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd, 492 F.2d 324 (9th
Cir. 1973); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
21. 407 U.S. at 90-93. The third requirement is the easiest to determine on the face of
the statute. The second is more difficult to establish, but the Court in Fuentes said there
"may be cases where a creditor could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor
will destroy or conceal the goods." Id. at 93. The Court did not indicate whether that showing could be made by mere allegation or whether a prima facie showing is required. The
process in the instant case may not meet the second requirement but it would be a simple
matter of redrafting to restrict its application to situations of "immediate danger." The
critical question is whether the first requirement is satisfied by sequestration. Fuentes stated
that summary seizure would nol be allowed where only private gain is at stake and that
ordinary costs of a hearing cannot outweigh a constitutional right. Id. at 90-92. Fuentes,
however, does not speak to the greater effect on the commercial structure of disallowing
creditor's remedies. See note 23 infra. The language of the Court suggests that a balancing
test will provide the answer. See note 20 supra.
22. 94 S. Ct. at 1899 nn.4, 5. In Orleans Parish a judge must issue the writ but the
statute permits issuance by a clerk of court. LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 282, 283 (1960).
Justice Stewart argued that this technicality does not cure the constitutional defect and that
the revision was "intended to make no change in the law." 94 S. Ct. at 1912.
23. 94 S. Ct. at 1904. There is continuing debate whether the Sniadach-Fuentes line of
cases has disrupted the credit system. See Clark 9: Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes and Beyond:
The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REV. 355 (1973); Krahmer, Clifford & Lasky,
Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXAS
TECH L. REV. 23, 52-57 (1972); Williams, Creditor's Prejudgment Remedies: Expanding
Structures on Traditional Rights, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 60 (1972). The judiciary has also considered this effect in dicta; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22, 92 n.29; Adams v. Egley,
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Fuentes by showing that the more narrowly drawn Louisiana statute affords
greater judicial protection to a debtor than the statutes condemned in
Fuentes.2 4 Fuentes, however, held that all prejudgment seizures demand notice
and an opportunity to be heard unless extraordinary circumstances exist.2 5 Because the Louisiana statutory procedures do not comport with the constitutional protections mandated by Fuentes, the instant case cannot be reconciled
with Fuentes unless the extraordinary circumstances exception is employed.26
The instant Court premised its analysis of the due process question on- the
27
duality of interest of the creditor and debtor in the sequestered property.
Resolution of the due process issue, given competing interests, required a
balance of protection, affording proportionate weight to the nature and magnitude of each interest.2 The Court concluded that the sequestration procedure
offered protection or compensation to the parties concerned, while not ad338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1970); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 549, 488
P.2d 13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971).
The Court may have been reluctant to overrule Fuentes directly as a policy consideration;
Fuentes had been decided two short years before. 94 S. Ct. at 1913 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Also, by not specifically overruling Fuentes, the Court preserved a modicum of the due
process protections it had extended to a previously unprotected class. The Court may have
chosen this case as an opportunity to halt further growth of the right to notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure of property. Justice Stewart suggested that the decision was a result of change in the composition of the Court. Justices Rehnquist and Powell
did not participate in Fuentes.Id. at 1914.
24. 94 S. Ct. at 1904. Justice White found that the Louisiana statute: (1) provided that
a state official would be responsible for administration of the process; (2) required the
creditor to post a bond and file sworn factual allegations of specific facts, not conclusibnary
statements; (3) pertained to uncomplicated matters that lent themselves to documentary
proof with little chance of mistake; (4) assured the debtor of an early opportunity to put
the creditor to his proof and an immediate full hearing on the merits; and (5) awarded
damages to the debtor if the writ or suit were wrongfully brought. Id. at 1884-906. The dissent, however, stated that the distinctions the Court used to deny the petitioner due process
protection were "relevant to determining the form of notice and hearing to be provided, but
not to the constitutional need for notice and a hearing of some kind." Id. at 1911. Justice
Stewart noted that each of the Court's points of distinctions had been considered in Fuentes
and deemed insignificant. Id. at 1911-14. See text accompanying notes 41-43 infra.
25. 407 U.S. 67 (1971). Nevertheless, the Court indicated that a debtor could make an
effective waiver of his due process rights. Id. at 94-96. The decision did not establish the
requirements for a hearing if held. Id. at 92 n.29, 97 n.33.
26. The Court may have been reluctant to establish explicitly "extraordinary circumstances" to escape Fuentes because it would cause the "basic constitutional rule of that case
to be wholly obliterated." 94 S. Ct. at 1911 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The Louisiana
supreme court, however, used the extraordinary circumstances rationale, reasoning that the
defeat of the vendor's privilege was an unusual situation. Id.
27. 94 S. Ct. at 1898-901, 1904-06. Justice Powell, concurring separately, also used this
concept. Id. at 1908-09.
28. 94 S. Ct. at 1898, 1900, 1905, 1906. "Petitioner . . . has both title and possession of
the goods subject to his contractual obligations" and "respondent ... had a vendor's lien on
the goods as security for the unpaid balance." Id. at 1908. See note 2 supra. In Fuentes the
Court stated there is no need to afford all interested parties due process, but only to "protect the interest of the person whose possessions are about to be taken." 407 U.S. at 90 n.22.
This is contrary to the concept of duality of interest, which the instant Court stressed. See
text accompanying note 27 supra.
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versely affecting the organization and vitality of Louisiana's credit and property systems.

29

The majority opinion in the instant case detailed the protections afforded
a debtor by the statutory procedure and the hazards to which a creditor would
be subjected without its protections. 0 Protection of the individual creditor or
debtor is a short step from protection of the greater economic system. Justice
White phrased the effect of an inequitable allocation of due process benefits
in terms applicable to the credit and property systems in toto.3 1 Responding in
micro-economic terms to macro-economic concerns, the Court attempted to
satisfy the first requirement of Fuentes, the "extraordinary circumstances" test,
by holding that preservation of the commercial structure is an important government and general public interest.
To allocate due process protections between the creditor and debtor, the
Court developed a tripartite analysis. First, an analogy was drawn between the
subject matter of Sniadach and the subject matter of the instant case. Sniadach
categorized wages as a "distinct problem in the economic system" meriting
special consideration.3 2 In the instant case the Court considered a "duality of
interest" concept that also presented a "distinct problem in our economic
system." The problem in the instant case, however, was that the creditor was
in an unprotected position when the debtor stopped payment. 33 The interest
of the creditor may be eroded by the debtor's using the property after he has
stopped making payments because the credit system relies on a direct relationship between use and payments. The physical deterioration of the creditor's
security can never be recouped by the creditor while the debtor, if wrongfully
34
dispossessed, can be awarded damages in reparation for his inconvenience.
This is merely a reversal of the Sniadach circumstances where the creditor had
unwarranted leverage to abuse the system. 35 In both Sniadach and the instant
case the "distinct problem" considerations spanned the economic system. But
in the instant case the Court found it necessary to favor right to payment over
right to possession and creditor security rights over debtor property rights.3 6
Second, the Court termed Louisiana's property laws delicately intertwined,
and stated that a disruption of one aspect would cause a severe imbalance in
the system. 37 Unlike the remedies provided in either Florida or Pennsylvania,38
29. See notes 23, 28 supra. "The government function in the instant case is to provide
a reasonable and fair framework of rules that facilitate commercial transactions on a credit
basis." 94 S. Ct. at 1908. (Powell, J., concurring). Louisiana has an interest in recognizing
this duality of interest and providing "somewhat more protection for the seller." Id. at 1900.
In a footnote the Court mentioned that the effect of notice and hearing before seizure has
been under study for several years and noted "the principal question yet to be satisfactorily
answered is the impact ... on the price of credit." Id. at 1905 n.13.
30. See note 24 supra.
31. 94 S.Ct. at 1905 n.13. See also text accompanying notes 32-44 infra; note 23 supra.
32. 395 U.S. at 340.
33. 94 S.Ct. at 1898, 1900; see note 1 supra.
34. 94 S.Ct. at 1900.
35. 395 U.S. at 341.
36. 94 S.Ct. at 1900-01.
37. See note I supra.
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a vendor's privilege is nullified when the debtor transfers the encumbered
property to a third party, and therefore sequestration cannot issue.3 9 If the
debtor were allowed notice before dispossession he would have an unfair advantage over the creditor. The Court noted that the Louisiana procedure
protects property pending litigation by placing it in the hands of the party
40
who can insure the other party of his good faith with economic security.
This aspect of the decision again illustrates the Court's concern with the
smooth functioning of the property system; it further implies a commitment
to preservation of property per se. The preservation of the property system is
obviously a macro-economic argument.
Finally, in the balance, the creditor's interest in the property obviates the
requirement of a hearing before a seizure because it outweighs the debtor's
possessory interest. 41 The compensations afforded the debtor for lack of notice
and opportunity for a hearing under the Louisiana procedure are the relatively
strict standard of proof that a creditor must demonstrate, an immediate hearing on the possessory issue and a damage award if the property is wrongfully
dispossessed. 42 Additionally, the Court asserted a desire to protect debtors as a
class from self-help remedies that would be the creditor's recourse were state
supervised remedies disallowed. 43 By placating the debtor with these compensations, the Court sought to counterbalance any advantage afforded the
creditor.
Although the Court did not explicitly rely on the "extraordinary circumstances" exception, the instant case can only be reconciled with Fuentes by
that means. The Court established the maintenance of the credit and property systems as an important government and general public interest through

38. The

UNIFORIM COMMERCIAL CODE

§2-403(l) (1973), provides that a vendee who pur-

chases on credit can transfer good title to a third party purchasing in good faith. See also
FLA. STAT. §672A03 (1973). The Uniform Commercial Code does not provide a vendor with
an action for reclamation of the goods when a vendee fails to make a payment after delivery
of the goods. The interests of both the vendor and a third-party purchaser are protected by
limiting the vendor to an action to recover the price. R. NoRasMoM, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF SAiLS (1970).
39. 94 S. Ct. at 1901.
40. See notes 23, 29 supra.
41. 94 S. Ct. at 1900-01.
42. Id. at 1900-01, 1904-06. The Florida writ of replevin considered in Fuentes was issued by a clerk of court when the creditor posted a bond for twice the value of the property, submitted an affidavit that the one seeking the writ was entitled to possession and filed
a complaint to collect the debt. FLA. STAT. §§78.01-.13 (1973).
43. 94 S. Ct. at 1905. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code. Section 9-503 is a codification of self-help repossession. The Florida supreme court in Northside Motors, Inc. v. Brinkley, 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973), held that
self-help repossession did not involve state action and was constitutional. See Comment,
Debtor-CreditorRelations: The Florida Supreme Court Helps Those Who Help Themselves,
26 U. Fr.LA. L. REv. 343 (1974). Because Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code there is even less evidence of state action in self-help repossessions in that state. Hence
the debtor is left more unprotected than his counterpart in any other state. Landy, Proposal
for Codification of the Commercial and Banking Laws of Louisiana- With the Uniform
Commercial Code as a Guiding Pattern,18 LA. B.J. 251 (1971).
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the same analysis that determined the apportionment of due process. Thus,
the debtor's interest in notice and opportunity to be heard, the functional
antithesis of speed and efficiency, may be subordinated to the state and cred44
itor interests in facilitating commercial transactions.
By purporting to comply with Fuentes, but not explicitly establishing the
situation as a government or general public concern sufficient to establish an
extraordinary circumstance, the instant opinion left open the question of what
fact situations do fit the Fuentes extraordinary circumstances exception. The
Court clouded its decision by asserting that it had distinguished Fuentes, which
it clearly had not. If the majority assertion that their decision did not overrule
Fuentes is correct, then the holding applies only to the facts of the instant
case. If Justice Powell was correct in asserting that the instant case does overrule Fuentes, however, then state legislatures could rely on the Louisiana sequestration procedure as an example of a constitutionally legitimate dispossession statute.

45

Champions of creditor remedies cannot rely on the instant affirmation of
the sequestration procedure as a panacea for the difficulties presented by
Sniadach, Fuentes, and their progeny. 46 If the Court recognized a need to
recede from the farthest reaches of Fuentes it should have considered the
elements of a valid contractual waiver.47 Determination of a form that would
be upheld in the courts as a waiver of the right to notice and an opportunity
for a hearing could insulate the credit system from Fuentes.48 It would not

have necessitated the fragile distinctions drawn by the instant case, yet would
have preserved the progress previously made toward expanding due process
property protections. The realities of the commercial world demand objective
standards that provide a definitive statement of authority and requisite form
of a valid contractual waiver.
BILLIE Jo OWENS

44. 94 S. Ct. at 1905.
45. See note 24 supra.
46. There is the continuing question whether there have been any direct or indirect
injuries from Fuentes. 94 S. Ct. at 1905 n.13. See also Williams, supra note 23.
47. Fuentes left open the possibility of a valid waiver, 407 U.S. 67, 94 n.31, 95-96 (1971).
The Court has considered waivers but has not issued a definitive ruling on the validity of
waiver in the ordinary creditor-consumer context. The Court has recognized waiver where
there was equal bargaining power between the parties, where the waiver was not part of an
adhesion contract, and where there was adequate consideration between parties equally
aware of the legal consequences. The Court will not presume that a debtor has waived his
rights. There must be a showing that the waiver was "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made. D.H. Overmyer & Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). See also Oller v.
Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (statutory authorization of seizure
pursuant to a waiver upheld); Swarb v. Lennox, 514 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'g 405
U.S. 191 (1972) (cognovit note as applied to individuals not unconstitutional on its face).
Courts, however, have struck down waivers valid on their facts that appear in fine print or as
part of a contract of adhesion. See, e.g., Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, rev'd, 492 F.2d
324 (9th Cir. 1973); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
See Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: An End to Misuse of Replevin, 34 Prrr. L. REv. 312 (1972).
48. See Krahmer, Clifford & I.asky, supra note 23, at 58.
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